

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates

10 October 1949

Acting Chief, Staff Intelligence Division

Difficulties in production of IM-232 as related to future emergency procedures

1. It is believed that one of the purposes in the production of IM-232 was to test the functioning of the present intelligence organization under emergency conditions. This report contains some observations upon the functioning of the intelligence machinery during the experiment.

2. D/St was informed orally before lunch on 4 October that a quickly coordinated intelligence memorandum was required estimating the consequences of a reported Czechoslovak demand for withdrawal of the Yugoslav Ambassador. Eventually, these terms of reference had to be somewhat modified.

3. No deadline was specified in the original demand and a completion date of 7 October was set with an interagency meeting on the 6th. When greater urgency was indicated (about 1430, 4 October-- (still with no specific deadline), it was decided to hold an interagency meeting at 1100 on 5 October and attempt final coordination and delivery by the morning of the 6th. Calls were immediately made (at 1500) to all of the agencies to alert them on the schedule. This final schedule was followed until 1245 on the 5th when new orders were received to deliver the fully coordinated copy by 1700 that day. Calls were promptly made to the agencies giving them this new deadline, requiring final action by 1630. Between 1630 and 1700 the delivery time was delayed to 0900 the next day.

4. It was understood that the DCI had personally made an effort to assure that all measures would be taken in the Agencies to allow clearance of the paper with the utmost possible efficiency. It also should be mentioned that the subject of the Memorandum was relatively simple and one on which it should not have been hard to gain quick agreement. It is believed that, lacking either the pressure from above or the non-controversial subject, trouble would have developed with the Agencies which would have made the cooperation received from them in this case unlikely. As it was, the only discrepancies noted in Agency cooperation were: (a) failure to meet a 1630 coordination deadline on the 5th; and (b) apparent failure of Army to make arrangements for coordination in accordance with the DCI's request. (It is believed that the Navy's dissent unsatisfactory as it may have been as a justifiable disagreement with the paper's conclusion was actually a result of the ambiguities remaining in a hurriedly produced paper.)

DOCUMENT NO. 003
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 889
DATE 12/15/77
REVIEWED 020854
AUTH: 18702

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. Performance within CIA may be summarized as follows:

a. Difficulties within the producing Division

(1) The analyst principally concerned in the estimate was out of the building when the project was announced, and no attempt seems to have been made to recall him although his services were presumably vitally needed.

(2) No sense of urgency seems to have been impressed upon the analysts who did go to work on the problem when it was brought to them. They, therefore, seem to have done very little direct work toward the production of a paper during the first afternoon.

(3) There was a tendency in the Division to spend time complaining about the nature of the problem instead of working on it.

(4) At the end of business on the 4th, ^{no} instructions seem to have been given to Division analysts as to the unusual circumstances surrounding the paper, and no work seems to have been done on it after 1700. Technically at least, fifteen and a half hours that could have been devoted to perfection of an agreed Division draft were lost.

(5) The draft shown to the head of the political branch in the morning was not satisfactory to him, still was not satisfactory when the meeting began at 1100. After the meeting he hurriedly dictated a version which was intended to incorporate suggestions put out at the meeting. This draft, very slightly edited, was the one actually circulated to the Agencies for final concurrence.

(6) The draft needed in D/St. at 1400 was not delivered until about 1420; at no stage in production was there time for impartial editorial review. Because no change could be made in the paper without agreement of all agencies, it was impossible to make changes suggested as a result of final coordination.

(7) One result of the above handling of the draft was a paper which may have represented a sound estimate but was not carefully phrased.

b. Difficulties in exchange of information

(1) For physical communication in the case of any sort of coordination, ORE must rely on telephones, couriers and meetings. The first is insecure; the second and third cumbersome.

(2) Personnel in D/St were on the telephone constantly on the fifth, their time for the most part being inefficiently used calling the four agencies in rotation. (Some calls failed in their object because all personnel to be reached were at lunch; under real emergency conditions, it would be necessary to stagger lunch hours.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) D/St had to make use of couriers when every minute (theoretically at least) counted. The CIA courier system, however, proved inadequate in an emergency, as it always had in the past, because the central service evidently lacks sufficient personnel. Only one courier could be furnished to make deliveries in two widely separated buildings, and it was with some difficulty that he was obtained.

(4) To save time, it was decided that a D/St representative should make one of the deliveries, using a CIA car. The latter service, however, proved useless in the emergency. (Briefly, the car had already been requisitioned, and the attempt to explain why D/St's request took priority proved more time-consuming than it was worth.) A private car was therefore used, which, under the circumstances required the time of two persons from D/St.

(5) It is noted that many of the difficulties above could have been eliminated if the IAC had been linked by a teletype system: the meeting would not have been necessary; rotation telephoning would have been accomplished in one teletyping; changes requested in the finished draft by one agency could have been made in the knowledge of the others.

6. Recommendations:

a. That all relevant components of ORG be instructed to set up procedures to be used in emergencies, applicable to the individual component or to several when joint action may be required. It is suggested in this connection that a pre-arranged signal be adopted whose receipt would indicate a genuine emergency.

b. That a teletype circuit connecting all agencies, and secure for Top Secret, be installed at the earliest possible date.

c. That in addition to (b) means be found through which couriers and transportation would always be available to ORG under emergency conditions.

25X1A9a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure A

Assumed Time Schedule for Production of III-232 Had Recommended Emergency Procedures Been Established

4 October

- 1200 - Description of project delivered to Division along with emergency signal. Division Chief calls in all needed personnel and arranges for systematic production of draft within time allotted.
- 1205 - Agencies simultaneously informed of project by teletype, including exact terms of reference and proposed time schedule. (Changes in deadlines likewise reported as received in ORE.)
- 1230 - State draft on subject delivered simultaneously to CIA and IAC Agencies, giving CIA time to use it and Agencies time to study it. Any other agency drafts or suggestions delivered. ORE works on its draft from 1200 as long as necessary to complete paper satisfactory to Division and to D/St.

5 October

- 0900 - Completed CIA draft sent by teleprinter to all agencies.
- 1100 - Teletype conference at which changes are offered and incorporated; dissents agreed if necessary.
- 1400 - CIA delivers final draft by teletype.
- 1400 - 1630 Agencies suggest any last-minute changes which can then be considered and cleared by teletype.
- 1630 - Agency concurrence or dissent delivered, initials indicating actual approval of responsible officers.

NOTES

a. The above schedule was purposely made out to involve the same period of time as that consumed in production of IM-232 to same stage of development. The result would have been, not quicker production but better coordination of a better draft. Obviously, however, time could have been saved. If necessary it should have been possible (a) to coordinate a draft by 1700 on 4 October, or (b) to have completed one during the night, or (c) to have had the job finished much earlier on the fifth.

b. The feasibility of the teletype conference for the purpose noted above would have to be tested. It might be found preferable to have a verbal conference instead, to have a verbal conference in addition, or to have Agency representatives present in the CIA teletype office during the teletype conference. It is noted, however, that the preference for face-to-face discussion of papers is probably a result of habit. One happy result of the printer conference should be the elimination of superfluous chit-chat seldom absent from the round-table.